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EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY ASSISTANCE MISSION IN SUPPORT OF UKRAINE (EUMAM UKRAINE)

ABSTRACT: This article presents the genesis, achievements to date, and challenges of the European Union Military Assistance Mission Ukraine. Additionally, this article highlights the challenges that have arisen during the implementation of the EUMAM Ukraine mission and presents proposals to maximize the effectiveness of the mission. The scope of the analysis is limited to the period from 15 November 2022 to 15 January 2025. The article is of a review nature and is based on publicly available information from the European Union and the countries involved in the mission, as well as scientific and journalistic studies devoted to the issues of EUMAM Ukraine. The article analyzes the factors that determined the decision of the European Union to establish and launch the military assistance mission for Ukraine. It also presents the legal basis for its activities, objectives, mandate, command structure, financing, and challenges resulting from the implementation of the mission, as well as proposals to increase the effectiveness of the mission.

KEYWORDS: European Union, military aid, Ukraine, training mission, EUMAM

MISJA UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ W ZAKRESIE POMOCY WOJSKOWEJ DLA UKRAINY (EUMAM UKRAINE)

ABSTRAKT: Artykuł przedstawia genezę, dotychczasowe osiągnięcia i wyzwania dla Misji Wsparcia Wojskowego Unii Europejskiej dla Ukrainy. Ponadto w niniejszym artykule zostały wyeksponowane wyzwania powstałe podczas realizacji misji EUMAM Ukraine oraz przedstawiono propozycje zmaksymalizowania skuteczności misji. Zakres analizy jest ograniczony do okresu od 15 listopada 2022 roku do 15 stycznia 2025 roku. Artykuł ma charakter przeglądowy i oparty jest o ogólnie dostępne informacje Unii Europejskiej i państw zaangażowanych w misję, jak również opracowania naukowe i publicystyczne poświęcone problematyce EUMAM Ukraine. W artykule przeprowadzono analizę czynników, które zadecydowały o podjęciu przez Unię Europejską decyzji w sprawie ustanowienia i uruchomienia misji wsparcia wojskowego dla Ukrainy. Przedstawiono również podstawy prawne jej działalności, cele, mandat, strukturę dowodzenia, finansowanie i wyzwania wynikające z realizacji misji, a także propozycje zwiększenia skuteczności misji.

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: Unia Europejska, pomoc wojskowa, Ukraina, misja szkoleniowa, EUMAM

INTRODUCTION

The Russian aggression against Ukraine has been going on for more than a decade, since 2014, when the Russian Federation annexed the Crimean Peninsula and sent its troops to the Ukrainian Donbas. In 2015, military operations were partially frozen, but Russia continued its hybrid war against Ukraine¹. The conflict escalated into a full-blown Russian-Ukrainian war on February 24, 2022. It has been the most significant war in Europe since World War II, not only because of the forces involved, the territorial scope, or the number of its victims, but also because of the variety of areas of life it directly or indirectly affects². We can also assume that the consequences of this war (political, economic, migration, and others) will continue to be felt within the Euro-Atlantic area and worldwide for many years. Despite the condemnation of the Russian Federation's aggression by the majority of member states of the United Nations, NATO, the European Union, the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Russian authorities have continued to violate international law and its aggression against Ukraine. The current mechanisms for maintaining peace and security in the world have proven ineffective in stopping Russian aggression against Ukraine. As the aggressor has been a superpower armed with nuclear weapons and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it can veto all UN Security Council resolutions it sees unfavorable to its interests. In the face of such a complex situation, the European Union, as one of the leading organizations providing security in Europe, has taken several actions, including establishing the military assistance mission for Ukraine (European Union Military Assistance Mission (UMAM) Ukraine). The European Union's operational involvement in civilian and military missions, being part of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), is one of the most critical manifestations of its effectiveness internationally³.

The establishment and launch of the European Union's military assistance mission for Ukraine at the end of 2022 were among the indirect responses of the European community to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation and a direct response to the Ukrainians' request for such military support. In addition, the launch of the EUMAM Ukraine mission helped the North Atlantic Alliance (for fear of provoking Russia) to distance itself from the Russian-Ukrainian war, even though the countries' membership in NATO and the European Union largely overlapped. The mission was also intended to coordinate efforts previously undertaken to train Ukrainian soldiers by individual members of the European Union. The EUMAM Ukraine mission is still ongoing, so it is impossible to offer a final analysis. However, more than two years of mission activities allowed for its initial assessment.

The article primarily investigates the background, achievements, and future of the European Union Military Assistance Mission Ukraine. Furthermore, the article highlights the

¹ B. Pacek, P. Pacek (red.), *Wojna Rosji z Ukrainą*, RYTM, Warszawa-Siedlce 2023, p. 24.

² E. Cieślak, J. Maj, K. Pająk, D. Prokopowicz, A. Radomyski, P. Soroka, P. Śledź, *Wybrane aspekty rosyjskiej agresji na Ukrainę w obszarze politycznym, militarnym i gospodarczym*, P. Soroka, K. Pająk (red.), ELIPSA, Warszawa 2023, pp. 7-8.

³ B. Przybylska-Maszner, *Misje cywilne Unii Europejskiej*, WNPiD UAM, Poznań 2010, p. 7.

challenges during EUMAM Ukraine implementation and discusses proposals to maximize the effectiveness of the mission. The article's author attempted to answer the research question: What are the background and achievements of the EUMAM Ukraine mission, and what challenges does the mission face? The scope of the analysis is limited to the period until January 15, 2025. The article is theoretical and descriptive, using the following research methods: content analysis of the subject literature, descriptive method, inductive and deductive reasoning, and media observation method. In addition, the content of official documents, including legal acts of the European Union related to the EUMAM Ukraine mission, was subjected to a thorough analysis and evaluation and compared with the practices observed during the more than two years of activity. As part of the research on these issues, an analysis of the factors that determined the decision by the European Union to establish and launch the military assistance mission for Ukraine was conducted. The legal basis for its activities, goals, mandate, command structure, financing, and challenges arising from the implementation of the mission were also presented, along with proposals to increase its effectiveness. The final part of the study presents a summary and conclusions about the issues examined. The issues raised in this article are critical for the ongoing conflict, in which the EUMAM Ukraine mission is essential in improving the Armed Forces of Ukraine's military capabilities.

BACKGROUND OF THE EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY ASSISTANCE MISSION UKRAINE

After Russia unleashed the war in eastern Ukraine in 2014, many Western countries started their contributions to the training of Ukrainian troops. Training courses were carried out within the framework of bilateral assistance, among others, from the United States, Great Britain, and most of the EU and NATO member states. At the same time, training assistance was provided within the framework of the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine (JMTG-Ukraine). This group advised and assisted the Ukrainian Armed Forces in developing operational capabilities in accordance with NATO standards⁴. Ukraine was also supported by the Defense Education Enhancement Program-Ukraine (DEEP-Ukraine), which aimed to adapt Ukrainian military education for non-commissioned officers and officers to the NATO educational standards⁵. After 2014, the tri-national LITPOLUKRBRIG brigade contributed to JMTG-Ukraine. It also conducted its own courses for brigade and battalion staff officers of the Ukrainian Army in the military decision-making process (Military Decision Making Process)⁶. In July 2021, Ukraine asked the European Union to create a military training mission for its soldiers. In October 2021, some of the EU member states, particularly Eastern European countries along with Finland and Sweden, lobbied for creating a military training mission for Ukraine within

⁴ A. Sławiński, *Polsko-ukraińska współpraca wojskowa po 1991 roku*, Rys, Poznań 2023, p. 78.

⁵ Ibidem, pp. 70-71.

⁶ Ibidem, pp. 77-78.

the European Union. This was due to the ongoing armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, where the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been fighting separatists supported by the Russian Federation since April 2014. At the same time, at the end of 2021, Russia repeatedly concentrated its military forces along the Ukrainian border, indicating the imminent threat of invasion of Ukrainian territory. However, in 2021, most of the leaders of the European Union member states, fearing to provoke Russia, were reluctant to discuss establishing a military training mission for Ukraine⁷. Ultimately, the European Union needed eight months after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation to complete the negotiation process for the establishment of a military assistance mission for Ukraine. The delay in establishing and launching the mission was caused, among others, by Hungary blocking the decision of the EU Council. Ultimately, using Article 31, paragraph 1 of the TEU⁸, Hungary abstained from voting, thus not participating in its implementation, but accepted that the decision binds the Union. Secondly, the delay also resulted from a dispute between the EU member states on the final shape of the mission's command structure.

During the European Union summit on 23-24 June 2022, the European Council adopted a resolution on the community's involvement in military support for Ukraine, justifying this with the need to help Ukraine realize its inalienable right to self-defense in the face of Russian aggression⁹. Adopting the above resolution was one of the first premises for establishing a European Union Military Assistance Mission Ukraine. In turn, on September 30, 2022, in a letter to the European Union High Representative, the Ukrainian government sent an official request for military assistance¹⁰. The request listed its needs for basic, collective, and specialized military training in logistics, medicine, chemical, biological, and radiological protection, engineering and cybersecurity support¹¹. The next step toward the creation of the EUMAM Ukraine was the approval by the European Union Council on October 10, 2022, of the crisis management concept on the possibility of establishing a military assistance mission to Ukraine within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy¹².

In formal terms, the legal basis for the creation of the mission was the Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1968 of October 17, 2022, on the European Union military assistance mission to Ukraine, taken during a meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States of the Union. This decision specified, among other things, the main objectives of the mission, its

⁷ A. Brzozowski, *EU might consider military training mission for Ukraine*, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/eu-might-consider-military-training-mission-for-ukraine> (3.03.2024).

⁸ Treaty on European Union (OJ. C. 191, 29.07.1992).

⁹ Press release Council of the EU, *Ukraine: EU sets up a military assistance mission to further support the Ukrainian Armed Forces*, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/10/17/ukraine-eu-sets-up-a-military-assistance-mission-to-further-support-the-ukrainian-armed-forces> (15.02.2024).

¹⁰ Т. Герасимчук, *Солідарність Європейського Союзу з Україною у протидії російській збройній агресії: безпековий чинник*, „Регіональні студії” 2023, № 32, р. 95.

¹¹ Д. Гайворонський, В. Левченко, *Відповідь ЄС на повномасштабну війну в Україні (Політико-правові аспекти)*, „Юридичний науковий електронний журнал” 2023, № 4, р. 678.

¹² Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1968 of 17 October 2022 on a European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) (OJ. L. 270, 18.10.2022), p. 85.

duration, financing, the status of staff, and the rules for the participation of third countries in it. Officially, however, EUMAM Ukraine, by the Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2243, began its operations after the Council approved the mission plan on 15 November 2022¹³. The above decisions were motivated by the need to improve the military capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces fighting in a defensive war against the aggressor. The European Union's consent to launch the mission may also indicate that a particular impasse has been broken in the minds of the European leaders about the need for military support for Ukraine and the fear of provoking Russia¹⁴. The conditions for deciding to establish and launch the EUMAM Ukraine mission are not complete. Still, they allow a better understanding of the motives that guided the European Union in this matter.

EUMAM UKRAINE MANDATE AND COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS

The UEMAM Ukraine mission has a non-executive mandate, the main strategic objective of which is to increase the military capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces so that Ukraine can effectively defend its territorial integrity and sovereignty and protect its civilian population from the ongoing Russian military aggression¹⁵. The mandate explicitly states that “the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) is aimed at strengthening the capacity of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and to deter and respond to possible future military offensives by Russia and other potential aggressors”.

To achieve such a complex objective, the mission provides individual, collective and specialised training for service members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Territorial Defence Forces that are part of them. It coordinates and synchronizes actions undertaken by the European Union member states to conduct such training¹⁶. In particular, the mission provides training for lower-level commanders from section or squad to brigade level, including operational training, such as preparing companies, battalions, and brigades for joint maneuvers and tactical actions. Additionally, mission staff advises on planning, organizing, and conducting practical shooting exercises¹⁷. To increase the effectiveness of Western weapons systems sent to Ukraine, the EUMAM Ukraine mission provides appropriate training to Ukrainian soldiers in operating, maintaining, and repairing donated weapon systems and equipment. It should be noted that the EUMAM Ukraine mission is the most significant and most extensive military

¹³ Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2243 of 14 November 2022 launching the European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) (OJ. L. 294, 15.11.2022), p. 21.

¹⁴ A. Koziół, *Uruchomienie misji pomocy wojskowej UE dla Ukrainy*, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, <https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/uruchomienie-misji-pomocy-wojskowej-ue-dla-ukrainy> (23.01.2024).

¹⁵ Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1968, op. cit., art. 1. par. 2.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, art. 1, par. 3.

¹⁷ EUMAM Ukraine, *Mission Mandate*, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eumam-ukraine/about-eu-military-assistance-mission-support-ukraine-eumam-ukraine_en?s=410260 (11.08.2023).

mission in the history of the European Union, as it aims to train 75,000 Ukrainian soldiers by spring 2025¹⁸.

The structure has been developed so that its activities can be adapted to the rapidly changing situation on the front and the long-term needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The mission's mandate initially covered two years until November 15, 2024. On November 8, 2024, by the European Union Council's decision, the mandate of the EUMAM Ukraine mission was extended for another two years until November 15, 2026¹⁹. Furthermore, within the framework of the above decision, the mission will cooperate with the North Atlantic Alliance, particularly with its Security Assistance and Training Agency for Ukraine (NSATU), headquartered in Wiesbaden, Germany, and staffed by approximately 7,000 employees. NSATU will carry out tasks that include supervising training courses conducted in training centers of allied countries for Ukrainian soldiers and supporting the long-term development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The command and control arrangements for the EUMAM Ukraine are typical for non-executive military missions within the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. The Political and Security Committee, acting under the responsibility of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and of the Council of the European Union, exercises the mission's political control and strategic direction. The Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) is the Operations Headquarters for EUMAM Ukraine and is responsible for the overall coordination and synchronization at the strategic level. Two main training headquarters that coordinate mission activities at the operational level are located in Germany and Poland. The multinational Special Training Command (STC) headquarters is in Strausberg, Germany, and the multinational Joint Forces Training Command (CAT-C) is in Żagań, Poland. The training centers responsible for running the respective modules are located on the territory of most member states of the European Union.

The Special Training Command controls about 1,500 Bundeswehr personnel and training personnel from other countries, such as Cyprus, Romania, Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Slovenia, and Norway. In Germany, Ukrainian soldiers are trained under the Special Training Command, among others, in operations of air defense systems (Patriot), artillery (PzH 2000), tanks (Leopard 1A5), and armored personnel carriers (Marder 1A3)²⁰. The diversity of training provided by the mission's training staff reflects the variety of equipment and weapons sent by the European Union member states to Ukraine. Additionally, the Special Training Command has been responsible for training drone operators, combat engineers, combat medical specialists, and

¹⁸ Agence Europe, *EUMAM Ukraine to train 15,000 more soldiers*, Europe Daily Bulletin nr 13472, <https://agenceurope.eu/en/bulletin/article/13472/1> (30.09.2024).

¹⁹ Press release Council of the EU, *Ukraine: Council extends the mandate of the EU Military Assistance Mission for two years*, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/11/08/ukraine-council-extends-the-mandate-of-the-eu-military-assistance-mission-for-two-years/> (8.11.2024).

²⁰ M. Raubo, *Dać broń i wyszkolić ukraińskich żołnierzy - wielka odpowiedzialność po stronie Zachodu*, <https://defence24.pl/wojna-na-ukrainie-raport-specjalny-defence24/dac-bron-i-wyszkolic-ukrainskich-zolnierzy-wielka-odpowiedzialnosc-po-stronie-zachodu-opinia> (11.11.2024).

cybersecurity specialists²¹. The EUMAM Ukraine training under the Special Training Command in Germany has covered around 260 training modules, which requires a wide range of instructors.

About a third of Ukrainian soldiers have been trained in Poland as part of the multinational Joint Forces Training Command (CAT-C) operations. The command is responsible for providing specialized training for artillerymen, drone operators, tank crews, and combat engineers²². Furthermore, the command makes every effort to best adapt the appropriate training to the needs of Ukrainian soldiers. An example is the training of assault engineers, in which instructors conduct training with infantry and combat medical specialists to maximize training effectiveness. An essential element in adapting training to the battlefield's realities is that Ukrainian soldiers conduct training based on real combat scenarios directly from the Ukrainian front. For the training, the multinational Joint Forces Training Command (CAT-C) provides Ukrainian soldiers with accommodation, food, medical services, logistics, and security.

The EUMAM Ukraine coordinates its training with a coalition of 34 countries that also organizes and conducts training for soldiers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces of Ukraine within different frameworks. These are, among others, the United Kingdom that implements the Interflex training program and the United States of America, which conducts its training within the Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine (JMTG-U)). EUMAM Ukraine works closely with Canada, most European Union countries (24 countries), Australia, Norway, Kosovo, Georgia, North Macedonia, Moldova and Albania²³. Although Austria, Croatia, and Hungary, as members of the European Union, are not part of the mission, instructors from these countries participate in the training of Ukrainian soldiers²⁴. In addition, the mission cooperates and coordinates its activities with the International Donation Coordination Centre (IDCC), the EUCOM Ukraine Control Centre, the Head of the EU Delegation in Ukraine and the Commander of the EU Civilian Mission EUAM Ukraine²⁵. EUMAM Ukraine is also open to non-EU countries' participation, as evidenced by Norway joining it on 6 December 2022 through a voluntary financial contribution to the mission²⁶. The EU SOFA agreement regulates the status of EU-led units deployed on the territory of the member states²⁷. However, the status of Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel participating in training is determined by individual agreements concluded between the countries that organize the training and the competent Ukrainian authorities²⁸. It should also be noted that the European Union has deployed all its military advisory and

²¹ Ibidem.

²² J. Zagalski, *Jak Polacy szkolą Ukraińców*, <https://www.polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleshow/42643> (12.11.2024).

²³ Rzeczpospolita, *Kraje UE przeszkolą dziesiątki tysięcy ukraińskich żołnierzy. Co więcej planują?* <https://www.rp.pl/konflikty-zbrojne/art39961641-kraje-ue-przeszkola-dziesiatki-tysiecy-ukrainskich-zolnierzy-co-wiecej-planuja> (2.09.2023).

²⁴ Ibidem.

²⁵ Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1968, op. cit., art. 7.

²⁶ Н. Романюк, *Місія EUMAM як новий формат співпраці України з ЄС*, збірник матеріалів інтернет-конференції: Україна в координатах Східного партнерства: пошук геополітичних пріоритетів крізь призму національної безпеки, Львів 2023, р. 37.

²⁷ Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1968, op. cit., art. 9.

²⁸ Ibidem, art. 10.

training missions on the territory of third countries so far. Still, in the case of EUMAM Ukraine, it departed from this rule for security reasons, thereby minimizing, for example, the risk of infiltration or a direct attack by Russia on training centers.

FINANCING THE MISSION

By Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1968, the financial resources allocated for implementing the mission two years after its launch amounted to EUR 106,7 million. These funds come from the European Peace Facility (EPF) established on 22 March 2021 by Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509²⁹, which replaced the previous EU financial instrument, the Athena mechanism. The main objective of the EPF is to increase the Union's capacity to prevent conflicts, build and maintain peace, and strengthen international security. The EPF is an extra-budgetary fund of the EU for the years 2021-2027, worth over EUR 17 billion³⁰. Within the Common Foreign and Security Policy, it finances all of the European Union's military and defence projects as a single mechanism³¹. Within the EUMAM Ukraine, the European Peace Facility also covers additional operational costs related to supporting training participants of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (transport to and from training centers, medical support, etc.) and operational expenses incurred for direct participation in training (maintenance of vehicles used for training, fuel, remuneration of interpreters, etc.). For this purpose, the Council of the EU allocated €16 million on 17 October 2022³². Furthermore, in December 2022³³ and July 2023, Norway signed agreements with the EU on voluntary financial contributions to EUMAM Ukraine for NOK 400 million (approximately EUR 36.5 million)³⁴. In addition, as part of the military assistance package in February 2023, by Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/231³⁵, the Union additionally allocated €45 million for the mission's training efforts³⁶. In March 2024, the Council of the EU established a special Fund for Assistance to Ukraine within the EPF, allocating EUR 5 billion³⁷.

²⁹ Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2015/528 (OJ. L. 102, 24.03.2021), p. 14.

³⁰ Council of the EU, *European Peace Facility*, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/pl/policies/european-peace-facility> (30.07.2023).

³¹ *Ibidem*.

³² Т. Герасимчук, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

³³ Council of the EU, *EU and Norway sign an agreement in support of EUMAM Ukraine*, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/06/eu-and-norway-sign-an-agreement-in-support-of-eumam-ukraine> (21.03.2024).

³⁴ Press release Council of the EU, *Norway: second Norwegian financial contribution to the European Peace Facility*, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/pl/press/press-releases/2023/07/25/norway-second-norwegian-financial-contribution-to-the-european-peace-facility/> (25.07.2023).

³⁵ Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/231 of 2 February 2023 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces trained by the European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (OJ. L. 32, 3.02.2023), p. 64.

³⁶ Press release Council of the EU, *Ukraine: Council agrees on further military support under the European Peace Facility*, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/02/ukraine-council-agrees-on-further-military-support-under-the-european-peace-facility> (5.01.2024).

³⁷ Press release Council of the EU, *Ukraine Assistance Fund: Council allocates €5 billion under the European Peace Facility to support Ukraine militarily*, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/pl/press/press-releases/2024/03/18/ukraine-assistance-fund-council-allocates-5-billion-under-the-european-peace-facility-to-support-ukraine-militarily/> (7.04.2024).

By extending the mandate of EUMAM Ukraine for another two years, the EU Council established a new budget for the mission for the period from 14 November 2024 to 15 November 2026, amounting to almost EUR 409 million³⁸.

CHALLENGES TO EUMAM UKRAINE

Training soldiers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which fight the most significant war since World War II against the regular army of an aggressor who is also a nuclear power, is an undertaking that the European Union as an organization has never faced before. The lack of such experience meant various challenges were inevitable for the EU MAM Ukraine.

The first challenge facing the mission is the time available for training. For example, by Western standards, training an entire brigade of professional soldiers during peacetime takes one to two years. But this time is for collective training only as professional soldiers have undergone their individual training. However, the realities of war do not allow training to be used for such a long time. So far, the Ukrainian military has usually been able to send its soldiers from the front line to training carried out as part of the EUMAM Ukraine mission for no longer than six weeks³⁹. This was mainly due to the operational pressure with which the Ukrainian Armed Forces are still struggling. Moreover, two-thirds of Ukrainian soldiers sent for training in EU countries are reservists, mostly brought up in the so-called Soviet style, and civilians⁴⁰. The relatively large number of inexperienced Ukrainian soldiers makes it necessary to focus more on basic military training, thus taking up the time needed for collective or specialized training. This short training period also increases its intensity, with Ukrainian soldiers training 12 hours a day, 6 days a week. In addition, an additional obstacle at the initial stage of training has remained the language barrier, which required the employment of a large number of interpreters, of whom there are still too few. Problems with the employment of interpreters result mainly from complex security requirements. Furthermore, EUMAM Ukraine instructors had to work closely with interpreters to establish communication with Ukrainian soldiers during demanding practical activities on training grounds. Attempts to create effective training in an accelerated mode have proven to be contrary to the safety regulations in the EU member states, which are intended to prevent accidents during training. It should also be noted that the Ukrainian system of selecting soldiers for training carried out as part of the mission has many ineffective solutions, which results in the introduction of constant changes to training programs. The groups of Ukrainian soldiers sent to training are not homogeneous in terms of the level of experience of the soldiers. The Ukrainian Armed Forces send both soldiers with combat experience, reservists, and newly called civilians to training. Furthermore, there are significant age differences between the soldiers sent to training, and the average age of a Ukrainian soldier is

³⁸ Press release Council of the EU, *Ukraine: Council extends the mandate...*, op. cit.

³⁹ P. Wilke, *Inside the EU's military crash course for Ukrainian troops*, <https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-military-course-germany-ukraine-russia-war-soldiers-training> (5.04.2024).

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*.

more than 40 years. Considering the above differences requires much flexibility from the EUMAM Ukraine instructors when adapting training programs⁴¹.

The ineffective use of trained soldiers by Ukraine is also worth noting. An example of this was signals from officers of the CAT-C that Ukrainian soldiers, after being trained as instructors, usually did not have the opportunity to pass on the newly acquired knowledge to their colleagues because they were almost immediately sent to the front to replenish losses⁴². Another problem in this aspect is the Ukrainian commanders' division of well-trained and cohesive battalions into companies to fill gaps on the front⁴³. Such an approach limits the impact of collective training carried out by the EUMAM Ukraine.

One of the mission's challenges has been adapting to the diverse training systems and infrastructure⁴⁴. Many facilities had to be allocated and adapted to the new challenges in training Ukrainian soldiers. In addition, it was necessary to create a so-called counterintelligence shield for training centers against highly probable forms of influence by Russian services (espionage, sabotage, diversion). The above decisions involved many instructors, logisticians, and support staff on the side of the state that organized this training. To understand the challenge for EUMAM Ukraine training, one must acknowledge the efforts required of the host nations. For example, for every ten Ukrainian soldiers trained in Germany, there are around 16 members of training staff and support staff (translators, military police, cooks, medical services, etc.). Ukrainian troops use numerous training facilities, which reduces their availability for military training from host nations.

The research team from the Modern War Institute (MWI), which had the opportunity to observe the process of training Ukrainian soldiers in EU member states, indicates the continuous adaptation of training carried out by EUMAM Ukraine to the needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces⁴⁵. This is mainly due to the dynamically changing situation on the battlefield⁴⁶. As the Russian-Ukrainian war entered its successive stages, the nature of the training carried out by the mission also changed. For example, the initial emphasis was shifted from defensive operations to offensive operations. One way to adapt training to the needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was to include its lower-level commanders with combat experience in designing training carried out as part of the mission. The use of these unique experiences gained by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the war with the Russian Army by implementing them into mission training programs improved the quality of training. It adapted the training provided by EUMAM Ukraine to the profile of the war being fought. MWI researchers have also observed that the

⁴¹ J. Watling, N. Reynolds, *Special Report: Stormbreak: Fighting Through Russian Defences in Ukraine's 2023 Offensive*, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, September 2023.

⁴² A. Chinchilla, J. Matisek, W. Reno, *The Polish Experiment in Military Advising: Improving the European Union Training Mission to Ukraine*, Modern War Institute at West Point, <https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-polish-experiment-in-military-advising-improving-the-european-union-training-mission-to-ukraine/> (8.11.2024).

⁴³ Ibidem.

⁴⁴ M. Raubo, *Dać broń i wyszkolić ukraińskich żołnierzy*, op. cit.

⁴⁵ A. Chinchilla, J. Matisek, W. Reno, op. cit.

⁴⁶ Ibidem.

training staff deployed to EUMAM Ukraine by individual EU member states has demonstrated nationally driven differences in military training, resulting in Ukrainian soldiers being trained based on national requirements⁴⁷. This approach may reduce the cumulative impact of the training modules delivered by different member states on the coherence of the actions of trained Ukrainian military units sent to the front. Therefore, it is necessary to improve, update (mainly based on the new experiences of Ukrainian soldiers), and unify the mission training program by the EU Military Operations Planning and Conduct Cell, particularly in cooperation with STC and CAT-C.

It should also be noted that, in addition to EUMAM Ukraine, the European Union has introduced two more assistance mechanisms, which were created, among other things, to provide military support to Ukraine. At the end of July 2023, the Council of the EU adopted a regulation on the support for the production of ammunition (ASAP), the aim of which is to develop the arms industries of the EU Member States, including, in particular, the acceleration of the production of ammunition, missiles, and their components by co-financing joint projects⁴⁸. In October 2023, the Council of the EU adopted a regulation establishing an instrument for strengthening the European defense industry through joint procurement (EDIRPA) to encourage cooperation at the EU level in defense procurement⁴⁹. Carrying out the above assistance mechanisms without coordinating them with the activities of the EUMAM Ukraine may result in an erroneous matching of the weapon systems on which Ukrainian soldiers are trained within the mission with those ordered and transferred to Ukraine. In this respect, it seems necessary to link the mission with the above two EU military assistance measures by establishing communication channels between the departments that oversee these three military assistance mechanisms.

The challenge at the EU political level remains the lack of unanimity in the community regarding a common decision on the continuation of financial assistance for Ukraine, including that allocated from the European Peace Facility to EUMAM Ukraine. The signing by the EU on 27 June 2024 of a security agreement with Ukraine, under which the Union committed (for at least 10 years) to, among other things, military support for Ukraine, in particular through the EUMAM Ukraine mission⁵⁰, may indicate the long-term nature of the EU's commitments to improving the military capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

⁴⁷ Ibidem.

⁴⁸ Regulation (EU) 2023/1525 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 2023 on supporting ammunition production (ASAP) (OJ. L. 185, 24.07.2023).

⁴⁹ Press release Council of the EU, *EDIRPA: Council greenlights the new rules to boost common procurement in the EU defence industry*, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/10/09/edirpa-council-greenlights-the-new-rules-to-boost-common-procurement-in-the-eu-defence-industry> (23.03.2024).

⁵⁰ Офіційне інтернет-представництво президента України, *Спільні безпекові зобов'язання між Україною та Європейським Союзом*, <https://president.gov.ua/en/news/spilni-bezpekovi-zobovyazannya-mizh-ukrayinoyu-ta-yevropejsk-91801> (7.08.2024).

SUMMARY

The Russian-Ukrainian war has resulted in numerous new challenges for the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy. Challenges have been clearly visible for the Ukrainian Military Assistance Mission Ukraine. The mission started with a delay out of fear of provoking Russia and due to a dispute between the European Union member states regarding the final shape of its command structure. The EUMAM Ukraine has become the most significant military mission implemented by the European Union for a country outside the Union. Furthermore, for the first time, a military mission of this type was deployed on the territory of most EU member states, mainly for security reasons. The mission's mandate has been extended and funding has increased since 2022 to reflect the rising demand for support to Ukraine. The activities of EUMAM Ukraine have contributed to increasing the military capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, in particular by providing Ukrainian soldiers with individual and collective training at basic, advanced, and specialized levels, including the use of Western weapon systems sent by the member states of the European Union to Ukraine. It cannot be ruled out that after meeting the appropriate political and operational conditions, the mission may be transferred to the territory of Ukraine, but probably only after the end of the active phase of the war.

After two years of the mission, its positive effects on the battlefield can be seen. However, it is still necessary to maximize its effectiveness. In this respect, it is necessary to improve the continuous adaptation of the training carried out as part of the mission to the needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces by updating the training programs with new experiences of Ukrainian soldiers. In addition, it would be necessary to standardize the training content by participating countries. It also seems essential to harmonize the efforts of EUMAM Ukraine with other military assistance mechanisms of the European Union for Ukraine. The extension of the EUMAM Ukraine mandate by another two years will also extend the planning horizon for the Ukrainian side with respect to future training of its soldiers through the EU mission.

The EUMAM Ukraine mission may be a vehicle for the military of the European Union and its member states to learn the proper lessons from the Russian-Ukrainian war. Considering that Ukraine currently has one of the most experienced armies in Europe, the armed forces of Western countries should, as is already visible, use Ukrainian experience, implementing appropriate solutions into their military doctrines, training programs, weapon systems, and tactics.

Of all the efforts made by the European Union to date, the EUMAM Ukraine mission is among the most practical in terms of supporting Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression. The experience gained by EUMAM Ukraine until January 2025 will be considered to better adapt training to the needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the coming years. These needs will depend on unknown factors, such as the supply of military equipment and weapons and the war's course. In this respect, a flexible training approach will be key to increasing the effectiveness of EUMAM Ukraine. The signing of the EU security agreement with Ukraine and establishing a special Fund

for Assistance to Ukraine under the European Peace Facility will facilitate the long-term nature of the EU's commitments, including financial ones, to the mission.

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