

Dužanka Slijepčević

ORCID: 0000-0001-9237-4955, dusanka.slijepcevic@fpn.unibl.org
University of Banja Luka, Faculty of Political Sciences
Bosnia and Herzegovina

Ewa Dąbrowska-Prokopowska

ORCID: 0000-0001-8296-365X, ewa.dabrowska@uwb.edu.pl
University of Białystok, Institute of Sociology, Poland

Duško Vejnović

ORCID: 0000-0002-7504-2796, dusko.vejnovic@fbn.unibl.org
University of Banja Luka, Faculty of Security Sciences
Bosnia and Herzegovina

Consociational democracy and green consumerism in function of the plural society

Demokracja konsocjalna i zielony konsumpcjonizm
w aspekcie funkcji społeczeństwa prulalistycznego

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Abstract: The problem is the lack of consensus in Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H). The subject are the characteristics of plural society (PS) in B&H and pluralist society, with a focus on consociational democracy (CD) and green consumerism (GC). Unresolved pre-political issues of B&H even in the 21st century condition the application of CD and alternative development solutions-GC and green and circular economy (GE, CE). Scientific goals are: description, understanding, explanation and prediction. Analytical-deductive and comparative methods are used, along with a case study of B&H. The main result is the discovery of GC, as a requirement of PS for sustainable development.

Keywords: plural society, consociation, green consumerism

Abstract: Problemem głównym artykułu jest brak konsensusu w Bośni i Hercegowinie (dalej B&H). Poruszona jest również tematyka cech społeczeństwa pluralistycznego (dalej PS) w Bośni i Hercegowinie oraz społeczeństwa prulalistycznego, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem demokracji konsocjonalnej (dalej CD) i zielonego konsumeryzmu (dalej GC). nierozwiązane kwestie przedpolityczne B&H nawet w XXI wieku warunkują zastosowanie CD i alternatywnych rozwiązań rozwojowych – GC oraz zielonej i cyrkularnej gospodarki (dalej GE, CE). Cele naukowe artykułu to: opis, zrozumienie, wyjaśnienie i przewidywanie. Stosowane są metody analityczno-dedukcyjne i porównawcze, a także studium przypadku B&H. Głów-

nym rezultatem jest odkrycie GC jako wymogu PS dla procesu zrównoważonego rozwoju.

Słowa kluczowe: społeczeństwo pluralistyczne, stowarzyszenie, zielony konsumpcjonizm

Introduction

Democracy is usually the rule of a minority—of the representatives chosen by the majority to rule in the interest of all citizens. So, democracy is obliged to search for a balance of different needs of society's subjects. While the constitutional mechanisms of majority (Westminster) democracy (MD) cannot prevent the emergence of some form of tyranny of the majority (TM), which appears as one of the possibilities of democracy¹, minorities are armed with consociational mechanisms to limit the majority. The actions of CD are important since they ensure the management of conflicts in the post-war condition of unstable states and PS such as B&H.

Methods

The problem is the absence of a common social demand or consensus in PS in B&H. The subject refers to the characteristics of PS in B&H, in relation to the characteristics of a pluralist society, with a focus on the best-known model of overcoming the problems of PS – the CD. The main hypothesis is that unresolved pre-political (cultural) issues of PS in B&H and in the 21st century condition the application of CD and alternative development solutions-GC and GE,CE. In order to answer the question: Do CD, CE, GE and GC represent mechanisms of sustainable development of PS in B&H? Scientific goals are set: 1) description of the peculiarities of a PS and pluralist society, and CD versus MD; 2) understanding the difference between PS and pluralist society, CD and MD, between types of GC and the types of green consumers; 3) explanation of the functionality of CD in the prevention of conflicts in PS, and the function of GC,GE and CE for the sustainable development of B&H; 4) predicting alternative solutions, in the form of GC and GE, CE, as common social demands of PS in B&H. Social

¹ F.Cunningham, *Theories of Democracy*, Belgrade 2003, p. 37-39.

goals are: 1) expanding the fund of knowledge about PS and its problems; 2) affirmation of proven democratic models for PS; 3) popularization of new approaches to consumption.

General methods are applied analytically-deductive and comparative², along with the case study technique³, which, in the social sciences, is most often used for empirical research of “cases of greater complexity”⁴, such as the arrangement of B&H. The results are realized goals, and first of all the discovery of reflexive consumerism.

Theory: Characteristics of PS

Furnivall introduced the concept of “PS”, defining it as a society “comprising two or more elements or social orders which live side by side, yet without mingling, in one political unit”⁵. Each community in PS possesses a set of values incompatible with the values of other cultural groups, so PS is a society without consensus, without a “common social demand”⁶. An illustration of the thesis is the example of building a religious object (a Chinese temple), which requires spending resources similar to buying groceries. In a homogeneous society, the construction of a religious building represents a “public good” because everyone can benefit from that. In PS, the construction of a Chinese temple represents a “public evil” for Muslims. In a similar way, Muslim mosques provide little or no benefit to the Chinese, just as Muslim mosques provide Catholics in the Federation of B&H. Thus, the needs of PS often result in public expenditures with benefits for one community and opportunity costs for the others. Thus, PS only isolates the demands of separate communities, failing to aggregate “common social demand”.

² J.Mahoney, *Qualitative Methodology and Comparative Politics*, “Comparative Political Studies” 2007, Vol. 4, Issue 2, p. 122-144.

³ J.Gerring, *Case study research: Principles and practices*, Cambridge 2007.

⁴ P. Alasuutari, L. Bickman, J. Brannen, *The SAGE handbook of social research methods*, London 2008, p. 214.

⁵ A. Rabushka, K. A. Shepsle, *Politics in plural societies: A theory of democratic instability*, New York 2009, p. 10.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 11.

The only common meeting place available to different cultures in PS is the marketplace⁷. Although people differ culturally, Furnivall argues that they are similar in their economic desires—everyone wants profit. In the absence of national consensus, economic competition between separate communities is the only viable joint activity. Hence, their mutual relations must be governed only by a laissez-faire economic process, in which the production of material goods is the primary goal of social life. In PS social order can only be maintained with the help of an external force, because of potential conflicts and/or clashes. In addition to force, there is more effective principle of social order and peace – tolerance⁸ and even “radical tolerance”⁹.

There is a difference between plural and pluralist society. As the sociologist Smith explains, a plural society is characterized by the coexistence of incompatible institutional systems and, therefore, force must be used to maintain order; pluralist societies contain one or more relatively distinct subcultures, but their value systems are compatible with the national consensus¹⁰. While a pluralist society is “normal”, the PS is divided, so if it wants to survive, a complex CD is suitable for it, compared to a pluralist society for which a standard liberal pluralist democracy is suitable¹¹.

Majority rule and the TM in democratic decision-making

How to prevent abuse of power by those who acquired it democratically? As Burke points out, the majority is able to oppress the minority whenever sharp differences prevail in the political community¹². Because of this, there is an impression that violence against the minority includes a much larger number of individuals and that it is carried out much more often than could ever be expected from the rule of one man. Etymology defines democra-

⁷ Ibidem, p. 12.

⁸ A.E. Galeotti, *Identity, Difference, Toleration*, [in:] *The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory*, eds. J.S. Dryzek, B. Hong, A. Phillips, New York 2006, p. 564-580.

⁹ Ch. Kukathas, *Moral universalism and cultural difference*, [in:] ibidem, p. 592.

¹⁰ A. Rabushka, K. A. Shepsle, *Politics in plural...*

¹¹ M. Kasapovic, *Plural and pluralistic society. Political glossary: Plural society*, “Political analyses” 2011, Vol. 7, p. 68-70.

¹² E. Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, London 1971.

cy as the rule of the people, to which sovereignty belongs, which is achieved directly (e.g. by referendum) or indirectly, through elected representatives. Therefore, the concept of majority (majority rule) is inseparable from the concept of democracy. However, realizing the principle of majority rule is not simple, due to the existence of difficulties in applying it. Rodin draws attention to the potential problem that can arise if democracy is determined as a form of government, because it can degenerate into TM and abolish the rule of law, but also itself with a majority decision. It only confirms that those who remain in the minority must obey the will of the majority with which they do not agree. But democracy could be acceptable only if it is legally limited¹³.

As Tocqueville states, with the spread of democracy, the awareness that the expressions “self-government” and “government of the people over themselves” are contradictory is arising, because they do not mean the rule of everyone by themselves, but the rule of the largest part of society over the rest. And there is already the possibility of abuse and tyranny of those who have power over those who do not¹⁴. Locke contributed to the affirmation of the majority rule, and he is credited with bringing the idea of majority rule „back into circulation“ at the end of the 17th century, that is, the right of the majority was introduced into the constitutional system that disciplines and controls that right. Since then, a new rethinking of the idea of the majority rule, which starts from the fact that democracy is possible only as a representative one, has gained a strong momentum. Such beliefs were once justified by J. S. Mill, who was aware that the ideal type of government must be of a representative character, since everyone, in a country larger than one city, cannot personally take part in the majority of public affairs¹⁵.

In the end, it comes to the legality that majority rule produces a minority or minorities that govern it. This is achieved by citizens electing their representatives to the parliament, which is a minority in relation to the electorate, while the parliament then

¹³ D. Rodin, *Democracy is neither the rule of the people, nor the rule over the people?*, "Political thought" 2006, Vol. 53, Issue 3, p. 3-18.

¹⁴ S. Drescher, *Democracy in America. By Alexis de Tocqueville, ed. Harvey C. Mansfield, Delba Winthrop* [Book Reviews], "Journal of American History" 2001, Vol. 88, Issue 2, p. 612-614.

¹⁵ J.S. Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government*, Cambridge 2010.

elects the government, which is a minority in relation to it. Thus, the majority rule “turns the nominal majority into a smaller number”.

The tyranny of the political majority and public opinion

According to Tocqueville, “democracy without liberty led to tyranny”¹⁶. While his predecessors understood the TM as political supremacy and violence against the minority (the tyranny of the political majority), Tocqueville, in the conditions of civil society, also warned of the social side of the TM – the tyranny of public opinion and the omnipotence of state power¹⁷. In the field of political institutions, the TM comes to the fore in the work of the legislative body, for the reason that it is elected directly and for a relatively short time, so that it is subject to the influence not only of general convictions, but also of the everyday desires of the majority. In addition, almost all the authority of the government rests in the legislative body, thus depriving the executive of its independence and subjecting it to the whims of the legislator. This only means that the omnipotence of the majority increases the instability of the legislature, because frequent changes in the legislature lead to numerous changes in the law. Therefore, the two biggest dangers for democracy are the submission of legislators to the will of the electorate and the concentration of all power in the hands of legislators¹⁸. Tocqueville recognizes the tyranny of quantity over quality in the striving for uniformity in democracy and for the rule of mediocrity.

The majority that wins power can not only impose its will on the defeated minority, but also to make them difficult for to come forward and express their opinion on political matters. Then the influence of the majority comes to the fore in the legislative body, in which the majority is represented and which expresses its will. In other words, it is a form of tyranny that is called democratic,

¹⁶ A. Craiutu, S. Gellar, *Conversation with Tocqueville: The Global Democratic Revolution in The Twenty-first Century*, Lanham 2009, p. 50.

¹⁷ J. Epstein, *Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy's Guide*, New York 2006.

¹⁸ A. de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America: Historical-Critical Edition of De la démocratie en Amérique*, ed. E. Nolla, Indianapolis 2010, p. 427-450.

“soft despotism”¹⁹, which is created by abolishing hierarchy, class differences and established ranks in society, which creates a mass of almost equal individuals, which is recognized as the only sovereign, but which, in fact, is deprived of all rights to manage its power (and even to supervise it itself), because above it stands the “collective power” of preservation²⁰, which has the authority to do everything on her behalf, without consulting her.

The threat to freedom is the encouragement of consumerism because “despotic regimes finance the hedonism of the people and fulfill their desires for legal freedom, with the aim of retaining power and political support”²¹. Therefore, it can easily happen that the TM, under the influence of political party leaders, with the demagoguery of empty promises, overpowers the competent political minority. Thus, the question arises of the possibility of an individual, who thinks differently from the majority, to express his political and social rights, due to the potential danger of his being outvoted by the majority. Just like Montesquieu, Tocqueville also believed that the political TM can be moderated by applying the principle of separation of powers, so that the power within the state will be broken into several branches, which oppose and limit each other. Exploring the American political institutions Tocqueville expressed the opinion that the power of the majority, embodied in the legislature, can be limited the most by a strong executive power and a strong independent judiciary²².

CD in the function of PS

CD is the best-known model for overcoming the PS problems, and its most successful example is the political system of Switzerland. SD implies consensual decision-making and the participation of minorities in decision-making. Although the term was

¹⁹ A. Ryan, *On Tocqueville: Democracy and America*, New York/London 2015, p. 46.

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

²¹ D. Slijepcevic, B. Kosarac, E. Dąbrowska-Prokopowska, *Social Tyranny of the Majority: Tolerance of disinformation and freedom of expression*, [in:] *Dezinformacja – Inspiracja – Społeczeństwo: Social Cyberssecurity*, ed. D. Boćkowski, E. Dąbrowska-Prokopowska, P. Goryń, K. Goryń, Białystok 2022, p. 112.

²² H.C. Mansfield, *Tocqueville: A Very Short Introduction*, New York 2010; J. Elster, *Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought – Tocqueville: The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution*, New York 2011.

first used in 1603 by JI Althusius, CD was formed by Lijphart, as an alternative to MD. Lijphart replaced the term consociation with “the politics of accommodation”²³. CD includes two sides of politics: segmented splits and political cooperation of segmented elites. CD assumes segmented cleavages with the possibility that political parties separately represent all segments, with cooperation and agreements between itself. CD imposes itself on societies in which there are strongly pronounced disintegration processes. In order to ensure and maintain the balance of integrative and disintegrative elements, it is necessary to approach the consociation, where the ruling party elites could act in the direction of a rational political compromise. The term “consociation” refers to the common life of different ethnicities in PS and the creation of institutions of power sharing among the associated political elites, in order to replace the models of domination with the model of partnership.

The consociational structure is made particularly complex by the situation when “an ethnic minority in a given country lives in a part of its territory where it constitutes the majority, but where other groups that form a minority in that environment also live, and in the state as a whole form the majority”²⁴. Therefore, dialogue and tolerance, agreement and reconciliation, concessions and compromises should lead to consensus and not to majority decisions²⁵. In PS MD is not suitable due to the danger of majority rule that denies minorities representation and access to power, which causes their dissatisfaction due to feelings of discrimination or exclusion. which is why they can refuse loyalty to the regime. Therefore, “instead of being satisfied with a narrow majority that decides, this model tends to expand that majority as much as possible”²⁶, to ensure governance “for the people”. As the best or most “realistic” form of government, CD appears where there is a large number of collective identities, none of which has an absolute numerical advantage.

From a series of CD elements contrasted with MD, Lijphart specifies two “primary” (executive participation and group

²³ A. Lijphart, *Models of democracy – forms and performance of government in thirty-six countries*, Podgorica 2003, p. 30-31.

²⁴ R. Radonjic, *Democracy*, Podgorica 2004, p. 77.

²⁵ N. Kecmanovic, *The impossible state of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Belgrade 2007.

²⁶ A. Lijphart, *Models of democracy...*, p. 75-76.

autonomy) and two “secondary” (proportionality and mutual veto) characteristics of CD. Participation in government means the participation of representatives of all significant groups in decision-making (grand coalition), especially at the executive level, while group autonomy (autonomy of segments) means that these groups have the power to manage their own internal affairs. “Secondary” characteristics can strengthen participation in the executive branch²⁷.

A key element of the success of CD is the principle of a large coalition of political leaders of all significant segments of a certain PS. In contrast to MD, where the leaders are divided into government and opposition, in CD political leaders of all collective identities of a PS cooperate in a large coalition in governance, which achieves the convergence of segments of society. The principle of a large coalition is based on the assumption that the political opposition can be harmful in times of crisis and in the MD, especially in the PS, since the plurality itself represents an aggravating circumstance. As prerequisites for creating a large coalition, Lijphart cites moderate attitudes and willingness to compromise. On the other hand, the possibility of entering the government is a strong incentive for moderation and compromise, because it reduces the risk of being deceived by the other parties or your own unfounded optimism about their willingness to make concessions. By being together in the government, parties that do not really trust each other have a guarantee of political security.

The veto right of the minority, along with the proportional representation and autonomy of the segments, is a mechanism of protection against the dominance of the majority. It is a mechanism by which collective identities are protected from the dominance of other collectivities. Decisions must be made by large coalitions, so when those decisions are made by outvoting, the minority can still be outvoted by the majority. When such decisions affect the vital interests of a minority group, such a defeat would threaten the mutual cooperation of the elites of certain segments. This is why the minority veto rule is important, because only it can provide a complete guarantee of political protection to each segment.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 33-34.

Lijphart also points to the danger of the minority veto principle, since it can lead to tyranny of minorities, which can call into question the cooperation within the grand coalition. However, he believes that it is not a big danger, because all minority groups have the right to veto, so it is unlikely that any of them will use the veto too often, because it could turn against them. Lijphart emphasizes the importance of proportionality in the distribution of legislative, executive and judicial power, as well as the available funds in the budgets of the consociational countries. This principle makes it impossible for all the power to belong to the winner of the election, rather it is adjusted to proportional principles that are agreed upon and apply beyond the election results. Therefore, this principle allows limiting the absolute dominance of the majority. The principle of the autonomy of segments is based on the thesis that the minority decides exclusively on its own on issues that concern only itself. It is a logical consequence of the principle of a large coalition: on all matters of common interest, decisions should be made jointly by all segments, whose influence is proportional, but in all other matters, decisions can be left to collectivities.

Results and discussion

Consociational “spirit” of Dayton B&H

In B&H there is a need to represent different interests. The CD model is suitable for this because it satisfies the national and other interests of numerous social subjects, and provides protection for minorities. Therefore, Dayton B&H²⁸, as a multicultural community, within the framework of existing legal norms, the Constitution and territorial borders, has only one permanently sustainable democratic model, and that is CD. It is sustainable because, through the principles of protecting the rights of ethnic

²⁸ The Dayton Peace Agreement (General Framework Agreement for Peace in B&H, started in Dayton on November 21, 1995, and signed in Paris on December 14, 1995) created predispositions for the development of a democratic society based on sound foundations of CD. Applied in B&H, it guarantees the practical application of the CD model, and any change in the content („letter“) and interpretation of the meaning („spirit“) of Dayton to the detriment of another, third party or any party that this Peace Agreement touches on any existential way can once again permanently disturb the peace and endanger the lives of the citizens, which has suffered from previous wars and is democratically backward.

groups, it would guarantee permanent peace, economic and political stability of the state. "The Dayton Constitution formalized a political compromise, i.e. the political order that actually made peace possible"²⁹. Just as the "letter" of Dayton should be in accordance with the "spirit" of Dayton, so individual and civil rights in B&H should be in accordance with the rights of the constituent peoples to equality.

Within the framework of unitarist concepts and models, these rights are mutually exclusive and negated, and within the framework of federalist-consociational ones, they permeate and complement each other. Therefore, the solution to the most significant and demanding legal-political issue in B&H (full institutional and administrative-territorial equality of the constituent peoples with the maximum possible respect for individual and civil and group-specific rights and freedoms of all citizens of B&H) is possible only in agreement with the "spirit" of Dayton, that is, in accordance with federalist and consociational principles.

Without a solution to the problems that B&H is burdened with, which include overcoming inter-ethnic intolerance, mutual recognition of the rights of ethnic communities, acceptance of B&H as a joint state, recognition of the constitutional position of the entity, strengthening of constitutionality and the like, consociationalism in it will not be possible. That is why it is necessary for ethnic communities to recognize equal national equality with each other, since all three are constitutive under the Constitution. This mutual recognition of the rights of ethnic minorities is a condition for the CD, which would require the same state-building rights to be respected throughout B&H. And despite the decision of the Constitutional Court of B&H from 2000 on the constitutionality of all three ethnic communities in the territory of the whole of B&H, in the functioning of the entity, that equality has not yet been achieved due to the unwillingness of the dominant nation to recognize equality for others, due to different interpretations of the decision of the Constitutional Court of B&H on the constitution of the people. And so, we often come across opinions ranging from those that Serbs, as dominant in Republic of Srpska (hereinafter RS),

²⁹ A. Savanovic, *Annex 4 – The Consociational or Majority-Democratic Constitution, or: On the True "Spirit" of Dayton*, "Serbian legal thought" 2012, Vol. 18, Issue 45, p. 30.

have greater state-building rights compared to Croats and Bosniaks, to similar assessments from the Federation of B&H that Serbs, in relation to the dominance of Bosniaks and Croats in to this entity, the rights are limited³⁰.

Considering the fact that at all levels of government there are elements of veto and territorial autonomy, B&H as a complex community is characterized by institutional elements of consensualism. Therefore, it is up to the ruling party elites to assume the obligation to agree on all issues of political everyday life, respecting the constitutional provisions. However, in B&H, a special problem is represented by the “difficult possibility of harmonizing essential elements of consensualism by the ruling elites regarding the functioning of the state and society. In this sense, it can be said that B&H has the institutional and constitutional potential for CD, but there is no rational relationship between the ruling party elites to reach agreements on common interests. Therefore, it is a practice on the stage that the ruling elites in B&H often hinder the development of CD, which is of interest for general social progress”³¹.

CD versus the MD

Lijphart identifies ten elements of CD, stating that they contrast sharply with each of the ten characteristics of MD. Through a comparative analysis of the consociation and the constitutional arrangement of B&H, Savanovic points out that there is no real difference between the “letter” and the “spirit” of Dayton, since the text of Annex 4, both in letter and spirit, has a consociational nature³². Lijphart's ten differences between the MD and CD³³ can be recognized as engraved in the text of the B&H Constitution (Annex 4). As Savanovic points out, it is a wrong approach to treat the consociational nature of B&H as the “letter” of the Constitution, that by abusing the wording “spirit” of Dayton, in accordance with the ideological goals of certain elites of the post-Dayton Bosnian-Herzegovinian political scene, the supposed majority-democratic

³⁰ M. Milutinovic, *Consensus democracy in complex states*, Svarog 2014.

³¹ Ibidem, p. 52.

³² A. Savanovic, *Annex 4...*

³³ A. Lijphart, *Models of democracy...*, p. 76.

nature of the Constitution would be highlighted³⁴. There are attempts to reinterpret the consociational Annex 4, which are aimed at moving it towards the MD. Therefore, “the spirit of Dayton is not a neutral formula that describes de facto condition, but an ideologization that wants to interpret and reinterpret the deepest basis of the Constitution as a majority model of democracy, most often by linking it to the formula of the ‘civil’ state”³⁵.

The 1st difference refers to the structure of the executive power³⁶. CD, unlike MD, which is characterized by the concentration of executive power in a single-party government, mandates the existence of a multi-party coalition cabinet. Often, CD opponents, in citing arguments about the “dysfunctionality” of B&H, refer to the coalition government's problems in harmonizing the interests of a large number of divergent factors, while proudly emphasizing the advantage of a one-party government whose more efficient functioning brings stability. In a similar way, the problem of decision-making in the domain of the legislative body is pointed out. When solving these problems, the eventual transformation of the structure of the government would also mean changing the constitutional arrangement of the state, i.e. its “spirit”, from the existing consensual to the “desired” majority.

The 2nd difference concerns the relationship between executive and legislative power³⁷. MD is characterized by the dominance of the executive power, while in the CD there is a balance of executive and legislative power. As a rule, in the MD, one party dominates both the Government and the Parliament, so due to the demand for efficiency, the supremacy of the executive over the legislature appears. “Although the Parliament can formally recall the Government, it is practically an unlikely scenario, given that the majority of votes are held by the party that has ministers in the Government. Realistically, the impeachment of the Government could only happen in the event of a significant factional split in the dominant party”³⁸. The supremacy of the executive over the legislature within the MD is also evidenced by the RS, which, leaning to-

³⁴ A. Savanovic, *Annex 4...*

³⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 19.

³⁶ A. Lijphart, *Models of democracy...*, p. 135-151.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 152-168.

³⁸ A. Savanovic, *Annex 4...*, p. 22.

wards such a form of government, manifests this characteristic of the supremacy of the executive power of the Government over the legislature of the Assembly. On the other hand, according to the logic of CD, in which the Parliament is equal or even dominant over the Government, the weakness of the State Council of Ministers is manifested.

The 3rd difference concerns the two-party versus multi-party system³⁹. Two-party systems are a characteristic of a MD, while multi-party systems are a characteristic of CD. While a multi-party system, according to the logic of things, leads to coalition governments, two-party systems produce single-party governments. Most often, within the two-party system, the two dominant parties differ on the issue of policies for solving economic and social issues, while on the issue of national interests and foreign policy, they are in agreement and compatible. “For the RS, there is a noticeable tendency to move towards a two-party system, where smaller parties to the left of the center, such as the Socialists or DNS, will formally or informally join the ruling party or disappear from the parliamentary political scene, while the opposition parties to the right of the center will be rendered meaningless by the dominant role of the SDS”⁴⁰.

The 4th difference concerns the differences between disproportionate and proportional representation⁴¹. Disproportional system is a feature of MD, while proportional is a feature of consociation. The disproportional electoral system implies the election of one representative of one electoral unit, whereby the one supported by the largest number of voters becomes the “winner who takes it all”, while the other voters remain unrepresented. However, this is not the case with the electoral system of proportional representation, since it aims to achieve the representation of minorities as well as the proportional representation of the parties won in the seats in the Parliament. “The party that wins the presidency wins ‘all’ seats, and the party that loses wins nothing. In this sense, presidential systems show an essential majority-pluralist side. This

³⁹ A. Lijphart, *Models of democracy...*, p. 116-134.

⁴⁰ A. Savanovic, *Annex 4...*, p. 23.

⁴¹ A. Lijphart, *Models of democracy...*, p. 171-190.

is precisely why B&H as a consociation has a Presidency, and RS, as a majority model, has a president⁴².

A 5th difference refers to the nature of relations between interest groups⁴³. Savanovic sees that the majority model is characterized by free competition between interest groups, while the coordinated and corporatist model of intergroup relations is typically consensual-it strives for compromise and alignment⁴⁴. This corporatism of consociation is, according to Lijphart, noticeable where interest groups are relatively few and relatively large in number, and also well organized into leading national parties, which we recognize as constitutional categories of B&H itself. The 6th difference, in terms of the nature of power, says that MD tends to unitary and centralize power in contrast to the federal and decentralized power of CD. This is according to the constitutional arrangement (both the “letter” and “spirit” of the Dayton Constitution), the B&H consociation⁴⁵ since it is both federalized and decentralized. According to Lijphart, federalism has the function of autonomy of ethnic groups, as well as amortization of the “paradox of the TM”. Thus, according to the words of Kasapovic, B&H is focused on „federalization as a solution“⁴⁶, due to the problem of the TM.

As a result of the eventual constitutional reform, federalization can have two variants: the so-called congruent and non-congruent federalism. Within the first variant, federal units are composed of homogeneous groups, so that they include the population and territory of the same social, cultural and ethnic origin. This variant was applied to the RS in a Dayton style, and in the background of this variant is the request of the Croats for a federal unit. The second variant, i.e. inconsistent federalism, where federations are composed of non-homogeneous groups, is advocated by Bosniak elites in accordance with their goals towards centralization⁴⁷.

⁴² A. Savanovic, *Annex 4...*, p. 24.

⁴³ A. Lijphart, *Models of democracy...*, p. 191-200.

⁴⁴ A. Savanovic, *Annex 4...*

⁴⁵ *Constitution of B&H*, Artic. I, 3, <https://www.paragraf.ba/propisi/bih/ustav-bosne-hercegovine.html> (access date: 19.08.2022).

⁴⁶ M. Kasapovic, *Bosnia and Herzegovina: A divided society and an unstable state*, Zagreb 2005, p. 77.

⁴⁷ A. Savanovic, *Annex 4...*, p. 26.

The 7th difference refers to the form of Parliament, in terms of houses⁴⁸. MD is characterized by the concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislative body. On the other hand, CD is characterized by the division of legislative power between two equally strong but differently constituted houses. Since B&H is a consociation, the House of Peoples in the Parliamentary Assembly of B&H is a legislative body that, just like the House of Representatives, participates equally and essentially in passing laws. This is not the case with the Council of Peoples in the RS, which is an institute with only a corrective function, where it does not have the power to enact or prevent the legislative activity of the Assembly. This is why the RS does not have two equally strong houses, but is an example of “weak bicameralism”. The 8th difference is between the flexible constitution characteristic of the MD, which can be changed by a simple majority, and the rigid constitution of the consociation, which can only be changed if a qualified majority votes for it⁴⁹.

When it comes to deciding on questions of the constitutionality of laws, as a 9th difference, it is important to point out that in the MD the legislative bodies themselves decide on the constitutionality of the laws they pass, which is not the case in the CD, since the laws are subject to judicial review by the supreme or constitutional courts. Therefore, in the MD, due to the absence of judicial review, the absolute guarantors of the constitution are the parliaments. However, the rigidity of the constitution and the existence of judicial review, as mechanisms of consociation, do not allow unlimited majority rule. B&H fulfills both conditions of consociation, considering the fact that according to the constitutional arrangement, it is characterized by constitutional court review and rigidity of the constitution (two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives). The 10th difference lies in the fact that CD is characterized by the existence of an independent central bank, while MD is characterized either by the subordination of the cen-

⁴⁸ A. Lijphart, *Models of democracy...*, p. 211-221.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 222-233.

tral bank or even its absence. So, B&H has, and RS does not have a central bank⁵⁰.

CD as a conflict management mechanism in PS

In the last decades, consociative peace arrangements have become an indispensable means of ending war clashes in PS. Guided by Lijphart's categorical attitude that it is certainly better to be in power together with yesterday's rival than to let him rule in your interest and remain in the opposition, Beljinac draws the conclusion that the warring parties are more likely to agree to an agreement that contains consociative provisions rather than a solution to the clash based on the standards of MD, if one takes into account the "rational choice of warring parties so that they do not find themselves in a subordinate position in the post-war constellation of forces"⁵¹.

CD is not only an effective conflict management mechanism, but also the best way to achieve and preserve peace in the fragile environments of post-war societies, such as Bosnian-Herzegovinian. Consociational provisions (sharing of executive power, proportional representation in the main state institutions, veto decision-making and autonomy) increase the feeling of security and mutual trust. In complex communities, the veto institute is a very important because it enables the minority community to block decision-making in the sphere of vital national interests. Therefore, if there are institutional mechanisms for power-sharing or a democratic culture that can withstand policy confrontation, ethnic mobilization will rarely lead to democratic instability⁵². The role of CD is also reflected in the fact that it enables cooperation between the leaders of the collectivity despite the divisions that separate them. Therefore, as Lijphart points out, the leaders should feel committed to preserving the unity of the country, and their willingness to en-

⁵⁰ In the original text of the Constitution (Article 98), RS had a National Bank, which was abolished by amendment LXXXVI.

⁵¹ N. Beljinac, *Konsocijativna demokratija u post-konfliktnim društvima*, "Politeia" 2012, Vol. 3, p. 207.

⁵² S. A. Wilson, *Politics of Identity in Small Plural Societies: Guyana, the Fiji Islands and Trinidad and Tobago*, New York 2012.

gage in cooperation with the leaders of other segments is also important.

GC as a “common social demand” of PS in B&H

Democracy is also the “expectation of material pleasures”⁵³, i.e. of well-being: “A nation that asks nothing of government but the maintenance of order is already a slave in the depths of its heart; it is a slave of its well-being, ready for the man who will put it in chains”⁵⁴. However, the demand for sustainable development, through reflexive (“conscious”) consumerism, would free people from slavery to irresponsible, linear material pleasures. Since the only common meeting place of PS units is the market, therefore, a high-quality solution to approach the “common social demand” in B&H would be “GC”⁵⁵. It is a new approach to consumption, often called “reflexive consumerism”⁵⁶. GC could be defined as a higher form of (ecological) consciousness and the accompanying consumer activity aimed at preserving public goods (primarily natural) from which everyone benefits. It is of particular importance for the stability and future of PS because, together with GE, brings a turning point from “what's in it for me” to “what's in it for us” way of thinking⁵⁷ since, based on these concepts, we begin to see that personal interest and collective good depend on each other.

Roach, Goodwin, Nelson point out that GC refers to consumption based on ecological criteria, although to some people this phrase seems to be an oxymoron (combination of the incompatible) because they do not see consumerism in relation with environmental sustainability⁵⁸. However, they differentiate two types of GC: “shallow green”, where consumers seek to buy environmentally friendly alternatives, but do not change their overall level of consumption, and “deep green”, when consumers also seek to buy

⁵³ L. Jaume, *Tocqueville: The Aristocratic Sources of Liberty*, Princeton&Oxford 2013, p. 82.

⁵⁴ Ibidem, p. 90.

⁵⁵ M. Boström, M. Klintman, *Eco-Standards, Product Labelling and Green Consumerism*, London 2008, p. 22.

⁵⁶ Ibidem, p. 22.

⁵⁷ R. Botsman, R. Rogers, *What's Mine Is Yours: The Rise of Collaborative Consumption*, New York 2010, p. 48.

⁵⁸ B. Roach, N. Goodwin, J. Nelson, *Consumption and the Consumer Society*, Somerville 2019.

environmentally friendly alternatives, but more importantly, they reduce their overall level of consumption”⁵⁹. Finally, *green consumers* are defined as “consumers who prefer products that are unlikely to endanger human health or damage the environment”⁶⁰, with another, but significant, difference that the former are willing to pay a higher price for eco-friendly goods⁶¹.

In any case, GC is increasing, both as a fashion trend and as an alternative lifestyle, as it is noticeable that more people are recycling, using shopping bags and so on. It is based on the GE, which the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) defines as an economy with a reduced risk of environmental degradation, and which results in the improvement of human well-being and social equality⁶², providing transformation towards smart, inclusive and sustainable development. The GE is also linked to the CE, which refers to the prevention of waste generation, its recycling and reuse as raw materials, which would be used for the further production of new values. GC would imply a transition from the existing linear (produce – consume – throw away) to a CE and GE, as a new strategy for approaching sustainable development. The circulation of resources from nature back to nature, and the complete disappearance of waste (Zero Waste) are the principles of the CE. The development of the GE and CE could also contribute to the emergence of new companies, i.e. entrepreneurship, thus conditioning an increase in employment due to the creation of new jobs, as well as an increase in the standard of living in Europe and the world. Therefore, there are many advantages of investing in green and circular solutions, because without a green transition we will not be able to survive on the planet and to be competitive on the (European) market.

⁵⁹ Ibidem, p. 26.

⁶⁰ Q. Zhu, J. Sarkis, *Green Marketing and Consumerism in China: Analyzing the Literature. Working Paper WP1-2015*, Worcester 2015, p. 21.

⁶¹ United Nations, *Profiting from green consumerism in Germany: opportunities for developing countries in 3 sectors: leather and footwear, textiles and clothing, and furniture*, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/278364> (access date: 19.08.2022).

⁶² Association of Citizens „Something more“ 2020. *Primer of green and circular economy*, <https://nestovise.org>, (access date: 19.08.2022).

The principles of the new EU trade strategy are sustainability, climate-neutral economy and green transformation, on which the economic interests of B&H depend⁶³.

Given that B&H is extremely endowed with natural resources, which are still “underutilized”⁶⁴, it is therefore an attractive market or consumer zone for foreign capital investments in numerous sectors (energy, agriculture, animal husbandry, forestry, mining, fishing, tourism, etc.), so it “must position itself on the international market of knowledge, ideas, goods, capital and everything else”⁶⁵.

Like most countries in the Southeast European region, B&H is a developing country, so it faces significant challenges in taking advantage of GC. „Developing countries face the challenge of how to cope with the emerging and continuing trends of “GC“ in Germany, if they do not want to lose market share in an important export market”⁶⁶. Otherwise, Germany, Scotland and Sweden are just a few European countries with an implemented CE, and Germany is at the top of the European top list, in this regard, because it is characterized by as much as 65% of recycled and composted waste from the total amount of waste materials.

Conclusions

The CD, as a practice characterized by negotiation, compromise and engagement, appears to be acceptable in complex communities, because it achieves the satisfaction of the interests of social subjects, and the preservation of peace, by suppressing possible conflicts. It represents the answer to the problem of TM in MD. It ensures equality for everyone and everything, so no one will be threatened as a minority. This will ultimately contribute to the development of peaceful, stable, prosperous and democratic states

⁶³ Foreign Trade Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina, *Conference held on green value chains and circular economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, <https://infokomscience.komorabih.ba/odrzana-konferencija-na-temu-zeleni-lanci-vrijednosti-i-cirkularna-ekonomija-u-bosni-i-hercegovini/> (access date: 19.08.2022).

⁶⁴ Ministarstvo vanjskih poslova Bosne i Hercegovine, *Generalni pregled*, https://www.mvp.gov.ba/ekonomska_oblast/?id=5436 (access date: 19.08.2022).

⁶⁵ D. Vejnović, V. Stojanović, B. Trivanović, *Bosnia and Herzegovina—State, or a specter for shady business*, „Sociological Discourse“ 2021, Vol. 10, Issue 20, p. 35.

⁶⁶ United Nations, *Profiting from...*, p. 52.

with maximally decentralized government, in which the right of veto is enabled to stop any solution that the group considers to threaten its vital interests, and the principle of the majority is replaced by the principle of consensus (general agreement of all participants in discussion).

Therefore, in PS it is necessary for several actors to share power, so that the state does not split, because the division of a multinational state ends in a monolithic form of a nation-state. Therefore, it often happens that CD is rejected by ethno-nationalists, but also by those who are in favor of pure citizenship. However, the rejection of the people, the three cultures, actually means the rejection of pluralism, so both the resistance to the consociation represent a formula of violence and splitting B&H or the TM. Without the consensus of the people on the model of the “civil” state in B&H, the very promotion of it would mean the rejection of the mechanisms of consociation, engraved in the constitutional arrangement of Dayton B&H, and thus the violation of the foundations of the General Framework Agreement for peace in B&H. This would result in serious conflicts/and or clashes between the three social communities.

The future of the country is not in conflicts but in collaborative consumption⁶⁷, which is at the center of the CE, with numerous benefits for B&H and its inhabitants: return to nature, economic savings, energy and resource savings, mitigation of climate change, new jobs and the like. However, in order for that model to succeed, the usual model of innovation in Europe is necessary-the synergy of the scientific (university), private (industry) and public sector (government) (triple helix model of innovation).

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⁶⁷ R. Botsman, R. Rogers, *What's Mine...*

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